

#	Question	Answer
1	Is there a report available describing similarities and differences between Chernobyl and Fukushima?	In ICRP Pub 146 there is one annex on Chernobyl and one on Fukushima presenting the management and key facts
2	why is the ICRP dose limit is 20mSv for occupational exposure and 1mSv for public?	Difficult to respond in few lines! Just few considerations not exhaustive. First, dose limits only applied to planned exposure situation, notably normal operation of nuclear installations. The age and duration of exposure are different for workers and members of the public. Therefore the radiation risk is different. Workers are exposed with monitoring of their exposure and strong regulatory follow up. For the public, there is no individual monitoring but impact assessment around the installation. In addition, optimisation of protection allows to maintain all exposures as low as reasonably achievable, and this is done below the dose limit. Currently, ICRP is reviewing the concept of tolerability of risk and its application in different contexts. Just short considerations. Other aspects should be developed. Information is available on ICRP website
3	who did the whole body measurements of 124 people? Who supported this? Funding?	For the WBC measurements of 124 individuals, no funding was received from any external source. An agreement was concluded between Hirata Central Hospital (the Institute for Radiological Science in Support of Disaster Recovery, a public interest foundation), located approximately 40 kilometers away, and the Suetsugi community, and the hospital carried out the measurements free of charge. The condition for doing so at no cost was that all procedures — including the application process and the explanation of results following measurement — would be handled by the community itself. The cost of chartering buses was claimed as compensation from TEPCO. * It should be noted, however, that this compensation claim was not made as a claim on behalf of the Suetsugi community as such. Rather, the compensation claims that each individual Suetsugi resident participating in the WBC measurements was entitled to make against TEPCO were consolidated, and submitted collectively by the community on their behalf — a process that proved extraordinarily time-consuming. Since all staff, including myself, were volunteers, no personnel costs were incurred. Measurement activities in the Suetsugi area were conducted entirely by volunteers through December 2014. From January 2015 through March 2017, a subsidy from Iwaki City was used. For a detailed account of the history of the measurement activities in Suetsugi, please refer to the open-access papers listed below: https://doi.org/10.1051/radiopro/2020062 (English) https://doi.org/10.5453/jhps.56.39 (Japanese)
3	who did the whole body measurements of 124 people? Who supported this? Funding?	124名のWBC測定の際には、資金援助はどこからも得ていません。40kmほど離れた場所にあるひらた中央病院（公益財団法人 震災復興支援放射能対策研究所）と末続地区とで協定を結び、そこが無償で行ってくれました。無償で行う条件は、申し込み手続きや、測定後の結果説明などはすべて自分たちで行うことでした。 バスのチャーター代は、東京電力に賠償請求をしました。 *ただし、この賠償請求は、末続地区への賠償として請求したものではありません。WBC測定に参加した末続住民の一人一人が東電に対して行う賠償請求をとりまとめて、地区が東電に請求するという形にしたため、とんでもなく手間がかかりました。 私を含めて全員ボランティアスタッフであったため、人件費はかかっていません。 末続地区での測定活動は、2014年12月までは完全にボランティアのみで行っています。2015年1月から2017年3月までは、いわき市の補助金を用いています。末続の測定活動の詳しい経緯については、OAの論文にまとめていますので、そちらをご覧ください。 https://doi.org/10.1051/radiopro/2020062 （英語） https://doi.org/10.5453/jhps.56.39 （日本語）
4	Why did the govt not fund restoration of buildings? Why would they only fund demolition and new building?	You may get some information on the issue in the official documents of the government. Link to Reconstruction Agency: https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/
5	what is the radiation dose rate within 5km near nuclear station?	Please see the link in which you can obtain all monitoring data collected by Japanese authority. https://radioactivity.nra.go.jp/emdb/
6	what is the highest radiation dose rate near the station now?	Please see the link in which you can obtain all monitoring data collected by Japanese authority: https://radioactivity.nra.go.jp/emdb/
7	may i know what happened to the nuclear power plant. my understanding is that not all of the plants were damage, is it still operating?	No more reactors under operation since the accident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP
8	How has TEPCO helped the revitalization of communities in the Fukushima region, if any?	TEPCO engages in various activities to support the recovery of communities in the affected areas. For example, they participate in local weeding and cleanup activities, and provide extra hands when community gatherings are short-staffed. At the many events organized by local municipalities in the affected areas, TEPCO in most cases deploys a large number of staff to help with operations. When there are vacancies in the rental sections of newly developed office buildings established by municipalities, TEPCO moves in and pays rent, and provides support across a wide range of areas. I have no doubt that these efforts have contributed in some way to local recovery — but whether this constitutes an appropriate form of recovery, I honestly do not know. This is because one could also argue that it reproduces a structure of dependency.

8	How has TEPCO helped the revitalization of communities in the Fukushima region, if any?	<p>東京電力は、被災地のコミュニティの復興のために様々なことをしています。たとえば、地域の除草・清掃活動や、地域の人たちの集まりに人手が足りない時の支援などです。また被災地の自治体が開催する様々なイベントで、ほとんどの場合、東京電力は多くの人手を出して、運営をしています。また、自治体が新しく整備するオフィスの賃貸コーナーに空きがある場合は、東京電力が入って家賃を支払いますし、あらゆる面で支援をしています。これが、地域の復興の一助になっていることはまちがいないと思いますが、復興のあり方として適切なのかどうかは、正直に言ってわかりません。なぜなら、これは依存構造を再生産しているともいえるからです。</p>
9	Question for Ms Ryoko- Could you kindly speak to how the radiation monitoring strategy shifts over time, particularly from the early phase to the longer-term recovery phase?	<p>The order of measurements was not decided in advance; rather, measurements were carried out in the order that they became feasible, or in the order that needs arose. In the immediate aftermath of the accident, measuring equipment was in short supply and difficult to obtain, and the monitoring system was not yet in place, so it was not possible to measure everything we wanted to measure right away. We began with ambient dose rates and radiation levels in the immediate living environment, then moved on to external exposure, and subsequently to internal exposure and food measurements. Food measurement was the one that continued the longest. Looking back, I think this was a very logical sequence. In the early phase, people's concern was with contamination of the surrounding environment and soil; as life settled down somewhat, concern shifted to food contamination and internal exposure; and since food is something that enters the body, anxiety about it tended to persist. In Suetsugi in particular, which is a rural area with many residents growing rice and vegetables in their own gardens, the need for food measurement continued for a long time. I think this pattern is likely common across different communities.</p>
9	Question for Ms Ryoko- Could you kindly speak to how the radiation monitoring strategy shifts over time, particularly from the early phase to the longer-term recovery phase?	<p>測定は、最初に順番を決めたのではなく、測定が可能になった順番、あるいは、ニーズが出てきた順番で行いました。事故直後は、測定機器が不足し、手に入れることが難しかったのと、測定体制も整っていませんでしたので、測りたいものをすぐに測れるわけではありませんでした。空間線量や身近な環境放射線量からはじまり、ついで、外部被曝を測り、さらに内部被曝と食品測定を行いました。最後まで続いたのが食品測定でした。振り返ってみると、これは非常に理にかなった順番であったと思います。まず、最初は空間や土壌の汚染が気に掛かり、暮らしが落ち着くと食べ物の汚染や内部被曝が気に掛かる、食べ物は体に入れるものであるため、最後まで心配が残る。特に、末続地区は農村地帯で、自家菜園で米や野菜を作っている人が多かったので、食品測定のニーズは長く続きました。これは、どこでも共通しているのではないかと思います。</p>
10	<p>The gap in perception between authorities and those directly affected regarding the situation on the ground is something that I believe occurs inevitably whenever a disaster strikes, not only in Fukushima. With regard to this problem of asymmetry between authorities and ordinary citizens, does NPO Fukushima Dialogue have any distinctive approaches of its own for addressing it?</p> <p>復興支援の過程において、行政と当事者との間に、現場に対する認知のズレは、Fukushimaに限らず災害が起これば必ず起こりうることだと思います。この、行政と市井との間の、非対称性という問題において、NPO法人福島ダイアログ様は、何か独自の対処法等をお持ちでしょうか。</p>	<p>In fact, during a brief period of one to two years just before the lifting of the evacuation orders, there was a time in Fukushima's recovery when the distance between those directly affected and the authorities became very close. The reason was that the national government's dedicated team visited the affected areas in Fukushima repeatedly, held extensive discussions with survivors and other stakeholders, sought to understand what the real challenges were, and then attempted to develop responses on that basis. I recall that during this period, exceptionally, measures were put in place that met with a high degree of satisfaction among those in the affected communities. Unfortunately, this did not last long, and today there are almost no occasions on which either national or local government exchanges views with those directly affected.</p> <p>Drawing on this experience, I would suggest that the following conditions are necessary to bridge the gap in perception between authorities and those directly affected:</p> <p>Sharing the time and space of the actual site where challenges are occurring (returning to the site repeatedly) Exchanging views with stakeholders, including those directly affected Thinking through responses together</p> <p>Beyond these, one further important element is that decision-makers and organizations must recognize the proposals and insights gained through the above process as genuinely significant. The dedicated team described above also struggled to gain understanding from other departments and supervisors in Tokyo for the on-the-ground perspective they had acquired, and were compelled to expend considerable resources simply to have it acknowledged. Since this constitutes difficult work demanding time, effort, and emotional energy, it lacks sustainability — and in the end, once the staff members concerned were reassigned, the momentum did not continue.</p> <p>On the side of those directly affected, I also think there is a need for a shift away from a posture of dependently seeking responses from decision-makers, toward a sense of being fellow members of a society working toward a better future together.</p> <p>As long as the relationship between authorities and those affected is framed as one between provider and beneficiary of administrative services, I believe it is inevitable that institutional alienation will occur in recovery support — where measures unilaterally decided by the authorities end up marginalizing the very people they are meant to serve. It is only by building a framework in which authorities and those affected address the situation together that responses satisfying to both sides become possible.</p>
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