IRSN INSTITUT DE RADIOPROTECTION ET DE SÛRETÉ NUCLÉAIRE

Enhancing nuclear safety

Transition out of regulatory control and post-closure

institutional control - what can be expected in the long term

Phil Metcalf Technical Advisor ICRP Workshop on Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste

The Celecton Fukushima Monday, November 6, 2017 Nature of waste suitable for near surface disposal

Post closure safety considerations

Transition from regulatory control





half-life

IRSN 3/16

- **Exempt waste** meets the criteria for clearance, exemption or exclusion from regulatory control for radiation protection purposes
- Very short lived waste can be stored for decay over a limited period of up to a few years and subsequently cleared purposes
- Very low level waste does not necessarily meet the criteria of EW, but that does not need a high level of containment and isolation and suitable for disposal in near surface landfill type facilities
- Low level waste is above clearance levels with limited amounts of long lived radionuclides ($T_{1/2} > 30$ years) requires robust isolation and containment for periods of up to a few hundred years and is suitable for disposal in engineered near surface facilities. May include short lived radionuclides at higher levels of activity concentration, and also long lived radionuclides, but only at relatively low levels of activity concentration





half-life

IRSN 5/16



Transition out of regulatory control and post-closure institutional control - what can be expected in the long term- 6 November 2017

IRSN 6/16



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Post closure safety considerations

Public exposure from radionuclide migration

- Optimisation
- Prospective assessment showing dose and risk constraints respected by inventory restriction, site characteristics and facility design

Possible exposure from potential human intrusion limited



Protection from exposures associated with human intrusion

- Imposing limits on the radionuclide content and distribution in the facility
- Efforts to reduce the possibility of intrusion events
 - Operational control
 - Post operational control
 - Avoiding valuable resources (mineral, water, agricultural/industrial/residential land)
 - Incorporating robust design features that make intrusion more difficult

Probability of inadvertent human intrusion cannot be determined as it is based on future human actions

Intrusion assumed to occur beyond period of control, but the radiological impact could not be severe due to limits on inventory



Radiological impact of plausible stylised intrusion scenarios to be considered by decision makers to evaluate

- Resilience of the disposal system to potential inadvertent intrusion
- Acceptable level of residual activity in the disposal facility

Because not possible to establish probability of inadvertent human intrusion considered prudent to assume intrusion will occur

This corresponds to existing exposure situation and reference level for existing exposure situations of 20mSv recommended



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Time

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	PRE-OPERATION	OPERATIONAL		POST-OPERATIONAL	
RADIOLOGICAL RISK	No waste on site	Inventory increasing compliant with WAC	 Full inventory Decay decreasing intrusion dose 	- Intrusion dose acceptable	Reduced
ACTORS	- Operator - Regulator - Stakeholders	- Operator - Regulator - Stakeholders	- Operator - Regulator - Stakeholders	Local authorityStakeholders	None
FACILITY CONTROL	Siting Design Construction	Licensed facility	Licensed facility	Local control	No control
PROTECTION MEASURES and TOOLS	 Design and siting requirements Safety case WAC development Licensing process 	 Passive containment and isolation barriers Site access control Operational control e.g. WAC compliance Nuclear regulation Periodic safety case update 	 Passive containment and isolation barriers Site access control Nuclear regulation Periodic safety case update 	 Passive containment and isolation barriers Inventory reduced by decay Land use restrictions 	 Passive containment and isolation barriers Inventory further reduced

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- Decision to be made by regulator to remove control (licence termination) in consultation with stakeholders local authorities and others
- Consideration of possible intrusion dose based on actual disposed inventory
- No reason to stop local control, but consequences acceptable

