ICRP Publication 125
Radiological Protection in Security Screening
Recommended citation
ICRP, 2014. Radiological Protection in Security Screening. ICRP Publication 125. Ann. ICRP 43(2).
Authors on behalf of ICRP
D.A. Cool , E. Lazo , P. Tattersall, G. Simeonov, S. Niu
Abstract - The use of technologies to provide security screening for individuals and objects has been increasing rapidly, in keeping with the significant increase in security concerns worldwide. Within the spectrum of technologies, the use of ionising radiation to provide backscatter and transmission screening capabilities has also increased. The Commission has previously made a number of statements related to the general topic of deliberate exposures of individuals in non-medical settings.
This report provides advice on how the radiological protection principles recommended by the Commission should be applied within the context of security screening.
More specifically, the principles of justification, optimisation of protection, and dose limitation for planned exposure situations are directly applicable to the use of ionising radiation in security screening. In addition, several specific topics are considered in this report, including the situation in which individuals may be exposed because they are concealed (‘stowaways’) in a cargo container or conveyance that may be subject to screening. The Commission continues to recommend that careful justification of screening should be considered before decisions are made to employ the technology. If a decision is made that its use is justified, the framework for protection as a planned exposure situation should be employed, including optimisation of protection with the use of dose constraints and the appropriate provisions for authorisation and inspection.
© 2014 ICRP. Published by SAGE.
Keywords: Security screening; Justification; Optimisation.
AUTHORS ON BEHALF OF ICRP D.A. COOL, E. LAZO, P. TATTERSALL, G. SIMEONOV, S. NIU
Key Points
The use of ionising radiation to screen individuals for security purposes is an exceptional circumstance that requires careful justification. It should not be presumed that the use of ionising radiation for security screening is generically justified or acceptable.
Decisions regarding whether or not to justify security screening using ionising radiation should include consideration of all relevant factors, including the definition of the screening objectives (threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences), the degree to which the technology accomplishes the screening objectives, radiological exposure during screening, alternatives that may be available to reduce exposure, and the possibility that some groups of individuals may incur a significant number of screenings per year.
In most cases, justification decisions to employ a particular security screening technology will include many factors outside of radiological protection.
The exposure of an individual to be screened for security purposes is considered to be public exposure. This applies irrespective of whether individuals are being screened as a result of their personal choices or as a consequence of their work duties.
Optimisation of protection for an individual to be screened should include consideration of the number of exposures necessary to accomplish the screening objective, the dose per exposure, and the avoidance of additional (or repeated) exposures.
Optimisation of protection should be applied during the design and operation of a screening system, and should consider the exposure of individuals being screened, individuals who are not being screened but may be in the vicinity of the screening, and individuals who operate and maintain the screening system. Dose constraints should be established and used in the optimisation of protection for each of these groups of individuals.
Individual occupational monitoring of individuals operating the security systems should not be necessary, other than as part of the ongoing quality control programme to ensure that the systems are functioning as designed.
Appropriate regulatory expectations need to be established and enforced for operator training, retraining, and competence; and for management systems to ensure optimised safety during operation.
Appropriate application of the framework of protection, including justification and optimisation, will provide adequate protection for anyone exposed by the security screening system, including sensitive populations. Thus, if the recommendations in this report are met, it will not be necessary to take specific protection actions for the security screening of children or pregnant women.
Screening of cargo and materials may expose individuals concealed in the cargo containers. This possibility must be factored into decisions considering justification of such screening, and the optimisation of protection.
The use of stakeholder dialogue and the provision of information to meet an individual’s right to know are important tools in the optimisation and implementation of security screening using ionising radiation. Communications need to be accurate, informative, and responsive to stakeholder concerns.
The Commission recommends the following:
The justification of screening should be considered carefully before decisions are made to employ the technology. The justification for screening should be reviewed periodically, given the rapid evolution in the potential threats and the technologies available for screening.
Security screening using ionising radiation should be regarded as a planned exposure situation. The exposure of an individual screened for security purposes should be considered as a public exposure. If determined to be justified, screening should be subject to the appropriate regulatory framework for optimisation of protection, authorisation, and inspection to ensure radiation safety in operation. If screening is not justified, it should not be conducted.
Systems that achieve the design specifications in the consensus standards, such as the International Electrotechnical Commission, International Standards Organization and American National Standards Institute, for various types of security screening devices, should be employed.
Key messages, questions, and answers should be developed and readily available during operation to facilitate stakeholder interactions.
Drivers or others involved in conveyance of goods subject to security screening should not be allowed to occupy conveyances during screening, except in very unusual circumstances. Exposure of such individuals should not be a matter of operational convenience.
Protection equivalent to that provided by the dose limit for members of the public should be used to assess the consequences of exposure of individuals concealed in cargo containers.
Executive Summary: Not included in this publication
ICRP, 2014. Radiological Protection in Security Screening. ICRP Publication 125. Ann. ICRP 43(2).
Authors on behalf of ICRP
D.A. Cool , E. Lazo , P. Tattersall, G. Simeonov, S. Niu
Abstract - The use of technologies to provide security screening for individuals and objects has been increasing rapidly, in keeping with the significant increase in security concerns worldwide. Within the spectrum of technologies, the use of ionising radiation to provide backscatter and transmission screening capabilities has also increased. The Commission has previously made a number of statements related to the general topic of deliberate exposures of individuals in non-medical settings.
This report provides advice on how the radiological protection principles recommended by the Commission should be applied within the context of security screening.
More specifically, the principles of justification, optimisation of protection, and dose limitation for planned exposure situations are directly applicable to the use of ionising radiation in security screening. In addition, several specific topics are considered in this report, including the situation in which individuals may be exposed because they are concealed (‘stowaways’) in a cargo container or conveyance that may be subject to screening. The Commission continues to recommend that careful justification of screening should be considered before decisions are made to employ the technology. If a decision is made that its use is justified, the framework for protection as a planned exposure situation should be employed, including optimisation of protection with the use of dose constraints and the appropriate provisions for authorisation and inspection.
© 2014 ICRP. Published by SAGE.
Keywords: Security screening; Justification; Optimisation.
AUTHORS ON BEHALF OF ICRP D.A. COOL, E. LAZO, P. TATTERSALL, G. SIMEONOV, S. NIU
Key Points
The use of ionising radiation to screen individuals for security purposes is an exceptional circumstance that requires careful justification. It should not be presumed that the use of ionising radiation for security screening is generically justified or acceptable.
Decisions regarding whether or not to justify security screening using ionising radiation should include consideration of all relevant factors, including the definition of the screening objectives (threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences), the degree to which the technology accomplishes the screening objectives, radiological exposure during screening, alternatives that may be available to reduce exposure, and the possibility that some groups of individuals may incur a significant number of screenings per year.
In most cases, justification decisions to employ a particular security screening technology will include many factors outside of radiological protection.
The exposure of an individual to be screened for security purposes is considered to be public exposure. This applies irrespective of whether individuals are being screened as a result of their personal choices or as a consequence of their work duties.
Optimisation of protection for an individual to be screened should include consideration of the number of exposures necessary to accomplish the screening objective, the dose per exposure, and the avoidance of additional (or repeated) exposures.
Optimisation of protection should be applied during the design and operation of a screening system, and should consider the exposure of individuals being screened, individuals who are not being screened but may be in the vicinity of the screening, and individuals who operate and maintain the screening system. Dose constraints should be established and used in the optimisation of protection for each of these groups of individuals.
Individual occupational monitoring of individuals operating the security systems should not be necessary, other than as part of the ongoing quality control programme to ensure that the systems are functioning as designed.
Appropriate regulatory expectations need to be established and enforced for operator training, retraining, and competence; and for management systems to ensure optimised safety during operation.
Appropriate application of the framework of protection, including justification and optimisation, will provide adequate protection for anyone exposed by the security screening system, including sensitive populations. Thus, if the recommendations in this report are met, it will not be necessary to take specific protection actions for the security screening of children or pregnant women.
Screening of cargo and materials may expose individuals concealed in the cargo containers. This possibility must be factored into decisions considering justification of such screening, and the optimisation of protection.
The use of stakeholder dialogue and the provision of information to meet an individual’s right to know are important tools in the optimisation and implementation of security screening using ionising radiation. Communications need to be accurate, informative, and responsive to stakeholder concerns.
The Commission recommends the following:
The justification of screening should be considered carefully before decisions are made to employ the technology. The justification for screening should be reviewed periodically, given the rapid evolution in the potential threats and the technologies available for screening.
Security screening using ionising radiation should be regarded as a planned exposure situation. The exposure of an individual screened for security purposes should be considered as a public exposure. If determined to be justified, screening should be subject to the appropriate regulatory framework for optimisation of protection, authorisation, and inspection to ensure radiation safety in operation. If screening is not justified, it should not be conducted.
Systems that achieve the design specifications in the consensus standards, such as the International Electrotechnical Commission, International Standards Organization and American National Standards Institute, for various types of security screening devices, should be employed.
Key messages, questions, and answers should be developed and readily available during operation to facilitate stakeholder interactions.
Drivers or others involved in conveyance of goods subject to security screening should not be allowed to occupy conveyances during screening, except in very unusual circumstances. Exposure of such individuals should not be a matter of operational convenience.
Protection equivalent to that provided by the dose limit for members of the public should be used to assess the consequences of exposure of individuals concealed in cargo containers.
Executive Summary: Not included in this publication
