The abstract of the ICRP draft includes:
"To systematize activities and measures, the Committee distinguishes between the emergency response managed as an emergency exposure situation and the transition to a recovery process managed as an existing exposure situation."
"The principle of optimization using reference levels, taking into account all social, economic and environmental impacts other than radiation, is essential for reducing the impact of emergency response and improving the living conditions in the affected area during the recovery process"
"In protecting the public and the environment during the recovery process, the Committee recommends a common expertise approach. This means that the authorities, experts and stakeholders work together to share experiences and information in the affected areas with the aim of fostering practical radiation protection statements that enable people to make their own decisions based on the provision of information about their lives."
However, in the case of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, the exposure limit announced by the government in April was only "20 mSv/year, 3.8 μSv/h.". It was decided that 20 mSv, 1/5 of the limit of 100 mSv for 5 years of radiation exposure for radiation workers, must be accepted by everyone from babies to pregnant women.
Parents who send their children to school protested that they should be evacuated until the decontamination of their homes and schools is completed. However, the government said that decontamination work could not be done yet because the place for decontamination soil had not been decided, and MEXT decided that if the radiation dose was less than 3.8 μSv/h, schools could be continued as before the accident.
The government's evacuation order was limited to within 20 km of the nuclear power plant. After that, an IAEA investigation confirmed that Iitate Village was heavily contaminated, and an evacuation order was issued to the people of Iitate Village. Although evacuation orders were issued, the central and local governments did not draw up any evacuation plans, such as deciding where to accept evacuees in advance. As a result, municipalities had to search for evacuation shelters on their own or residents had to search for evacuation shelters on their own. Although SPEEDI, which is under the control of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, was able to predict which direction the plume would flow, the results were not utilized at all for evacuation, and many people evacuated in the direction of the plume's flow. The shelters were places too harsh for elderly people, sick people, small children and pregnant women, such as the gymnasium of a school that had been shut down. Even in Namie Town, which was the passageway point for the plume, many people had no choice but to evacuate to shelters where it was difficult to prevent radiation exposure indoors, as snow and wind blew in. Even after the screening before entering the evacuation center, we could not prepare hot water to wash the body or clothes to change for decontamination. Therefore, we raised the standard of 13,000 cpm to 100,000 cpm to allow evacuees waiting in cold outdoors to enter the evacuation center. People were left in contaminated clothes. People other than evacuees are not provided with stable iodine tablets and the windows are closed. Before entering the house, they took off their hats, wore masks that did not inhale radioactive substances, and wore jackets that were worn outdoors. They were wrapped in plastic, protected from the rain, and if they were exposed to the rain, they did not wash their heads or bodies immediately to prevent internal radiation exposure.
Evacuation was decided to be within 20 km of the nuclear power plant, but the contamination did not spread concentrically. Even so, people who were not within the zone had no choice but to evacuate on their own judgment even if they were to be exposed to radiation equal to or higher than that of the area within the zone. TEPCO did not pay 100,000 yen per person per month as consolation money, which was granted to residents within a 20 km radius of the zone. As a result, the disaster grant aid was the only support that was terminated in March 2017.
The standard of 20 mSv per year, which was set in April 2011, is 20 times the limit of radiation exposure before the accident. It continues as it is now, and the current exposure limit is the same as the exposure limit in an emergency.
The current exposure level is not as low as 1 ~ 20 mSv, but more than 5 mSv of the "Chernobyl Act" created in the former Soviet Union 5 years after the Chernobyl accident was forcibly relocated. Areas where exposure to up to 1 ~ 5 mSv is expected should be given the right to evacuate, and the government should provide support such as housing and job hunting. In Japan, however, in June 2012, lawmaker proposed a law entitled "Act on Support for Children and Victims of Nuclear Accident" which was passed by the Diet. However, despite plans to include support for evacuations, free health checkups for the residents who were exposed to radiation, and reduction and exemption of medical expenses for illnesses thought to be caused by radiation exposure, the only thing that was decided to be actually carried out was thyroid echo testing for residents who were 18 years old or younger at the time of the accident in Fukushima Prefecture.
Outside Fukushima Prefecture, radiation exposure to the thyroid gland became serious in a wide range of areas due to the widespread dispersion of radioactive iodine at the time of the accident. However, iodine tablets were not distributed to residents, with a few exceptions such as municipalities hosting nuclear power plants, Miharu Town, and Iwaki City, and many residents did not take them even after they were distributed, because they were not instructed to take them. Thyroid radiation was measured in only 1080 children, and in some cases, measurements taken at high background sites were highly suspicious of being negative after subtracting background radiation.
For the measurement of thyroid gland "The causal relationship with the nuclear accident is unlikely.", for example, Professor Tokoji from Hirosaki University came to Fukushima Prefecture, but there was a request to stop the measurement on the way, and the government and prefecture did not measure the thyroid gland of the residents because the measuring device was too heavy and it would be hard to have the residents come all the way to measure it. Based on the measurement of only 1080 200 people, thyroid gland echo inspection by Fukushima Prefectural Health Survey showed that the residents of Fukushima had benign lymph node metastasis and they were more than 18 years old at the time of the accident, I don't think it makes any sense to say in the report of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Survey Review Committee which was selected by the government.
At the time of the Chernobyl disaster, I heard that the increase in thyroid cancer was prevented in Poland, Ukraine's neighbor, by the administration of iodine tablets by the government. Belarus and Ukraine did not take iodine tablets, and the number of thyroid cancer cases among children dramatically increased. 10 years after the accident, the WHO was forced to acknowledge the impact of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Although the preventive effects of iodine tablets have been proven, the lessons learned were not utilized at all in the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. Many people did not take iodine tablets even after they were distributed, because they were not given instructions on how to take them or when to take them. Neither the national government nor the local government could quickly evacuate residents near the nuclear power plant to a safe place where they would not be exposed to radiation.
I heard that some nuclear power plants in the United States that could not draw up evacuation plans were closed because they were not permitted to operate. In Japan, even if there is no evacuation plan, you can get permission to operate a nuclear power plant.
I don't think this is right. Japan is an earthquake-prone country, and 10% of the world's major earthquakes occur in Japan. Furthermore, due to climate change, heavy rain and floods occur every year during the rainy season and typhoon season, destroying a wide range of houses. If a nuclear accident occurs at such time, it is impossible for residents to evacuate safely. Because the Chernobyl nuclear accident was not caused by a natural disaster such as an earthquake, all residents of Pripyat City were able to evacuate quickly by bus or train the following day. In Japan, however, because all nuclear power plants are located on the seashore, and nuclear power plants are also located on the land close to the mountains, there is only one narrow road, or the residents on the tip of the cape have no choice but to evacuate the sea. When an accident occurs, if it overlaps with an earthquake, a typhoon or a rainstorm, the road will be cut off and it will be impossible to evacuate outside.
I can only think that Japan was wrong to introduce nuclear power plants. It is difficult to understand why the United States recommended nuclear power technology to Japan, which is in an earthquake zone throughout Japan, and why the Japanese government accepted and promoted it.
It is already clear that nuclear power plants cannot be operated in Japan.
I would like the ICRP to clearly recognize and make recommendations that Japan has no choice but to give up on using nuclear energy for power generation.
This year, too, a large area of Japan has experienced massive river flooding caused by a huge typhoon, levees have collapsed, houses have been crushed by landslides and cave-ins, roads have been cut off, railroads have become impassable, and it is extremely difficult for people affected by flood disasters to evacuate. In Japan, most of the power lines were not buried underground, so many utility poles fell down, and the power lines were cut off. In Chiba Prefecture, large-scale blackouts continued for a long time. The decontaminated soil in the bag was also washed away by the typhoon. Why can a nuclear power plant, which can lead to a fatal accident due to a rupture of a pipe, a power failure, or the failure of an auxiliary power supply, operate even though it is difficult to cope with a natural disaster?
In the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, a wide area was contaminated with radioactive materials, but the opinions of the general public and even residents close to the nuclear power plant were never incorporated into policy.If you want public comment, please advise "The government and electric power companies must take into account the opinions of residents.".
Please advise ICRP that "It is impossible to operate a nuclear power plant in Japan because the possibility of further destructive accidents cannot be ruled out.".